Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) – Losing the Initiative: The PKK’s Crumbling Strategy

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Abdullah Öcalan, AKP, BDP, Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, Iraqi Kurdistan, KCK, MIT, Murat Karayılan, PKK

The original version of this analysis can be found on Terrorism Monitor, Volume X, Issue 6

The winter of 2011/2012 witnessed an intensified campaign by the Turkish government against the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) and the network of organizations and individuals that supports it. The armed group, identified as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the European Union, Canada and the United States, has been attacked by Turkey’s counterinsurgency campaign at different levels. Persistent cross-border air strikes continue to hit PKK bases in the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, as the Turkish military try to create havoc in PKK’s “safe havens.” Given the difficulty of moving in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan and southeastern Turkey during the winter, the PKK has traditionally staged a “tactical retreat” to their bases in winter, transferring operations to their urban branches and returning to the field as soon as possible in the spring.

However, this year the PKK commanders decided to break this cyclical pattern and engage Turkish security forces in a winter campaign. The decision proved short-sighted, as PKK casualties reached into the hundreds, with at least ten fighters dying from exposure in the rough winter conditions (Today’s Zaman, December 27, 2011; Firat News Agency, March 12). The campaign also led to a peak in surrenders, as security forces captured dozens of PKK fighters. Some of those who were interrogated have been cooperative and provided substantial information leading to the discovery of several PKK hideouts located in rural areas of southeastern Turkey containing considerable amounts of explosives, weapons and food (Today’s Zaman, December 27, 2011; Hurriyet Daily News, March 16).

In an attempt to seize the initiative, Turkey’s ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) has also been working on a new strategy aimed at exploiting and widening internal divisions within the PKK. The idea, suggested and planned by the Interior Ministry, is to implement a system of bounties for the capture of PKK mid- and high-level cadres. Should it be accepted, the new system is supposed to work within the existing framework of Law No. 221 of the Turkish Penal Code, which grants amnesty to members of terrorist organizations who defect without having participated in any prior criminal action. Accordingly, the strategy aims at attracting those who only recently joined the PKK and tries to exploit recent waves of defections. Even though it is unlikely to lead to substantive captures, it is expected to create tensions and increase distrust within PKK (Today’s Zaman, February 29; March 9).

The Turkish government has also tackled the PKK’s political infrastructure. Since November, 2011 Turkish authorities have launched an ongoing crackdown on the Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK), an illegal political organization that gathers several Kurdish organizations together under one umbrella. The KCK is accused of operating as an urban and political wing of the PKK and of running “a state within a state” in southeastern Turkey through a parallel government that carries out tax collection and administers justice (Hurriyet Daily News, November 22, 2011; Today’s Zaman, December 28, 2011). By arresting several key members, the operation increased communications difficulties between the KCK and the Qandil-based Kongra-Gel (the KCK’s executive assembly), chaired by PKK commander Murat Karayilan. Communications with Abdullah Ocalan have been interrupted as well.  For years, the PKK’s imprisoned founder kept leading the terrorist group via confidential communications with his lawyers, the only visitors he was allowed to have while serving his life sentence in isolation at the Imrali Island prison. However, visits were suspended several months ago, and many of his lawyers were arrested for their alleged ties with KCK, leaving the PKK without Ocalan’s strategic guidance (Today’s Zaman, November 22).

The crackdown on the KCK triggered strong protests by the Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP – Peace and Democracy Party), Turkey’s main Kurdish political party. The party was founded in 2008, just before its predecessor, the Demokratik Toplum Partisi (DTP – Democratic Society Party), was disbanded for its ties with PKK. The BDP has been accused of being the electoral offshoot of the PKK and several of its members and mayors (the BDP runs almost 100 municipalities in Turkey) have recently been arrested for their alleged affiliation with the KCK. Despite its high electoral appeal to Turkey’s Kurdish community, BDP leaders have so far lacked political incisiveness, and seem now stuck on the pursuit of long term objectives, while they have not yet managed to engage the government in short term-oriented negotiations.

The BDP’s recent proposal for the creation of a governmental delegation to start negotiations with the PKK will hardly lead anywhere, given the fact that the party insists on a general amnesty for all PKK fighters (including Abdullah Ocalan), a clear no-go for the Turkish government (Today’s Zaman, February 6). The BDP’s political feebleness becomes apparent when considering that, behind the scenes; Turkish authorities have already started informal negotiations with the PKK itself. Representatives of the Turkish government have been meeting Abdullah Ocalan on a regular basis and top level officials from the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT – National Intelligence Organization) met high-ranking PKK members in order to discuss and assess potential proposals. In fact, discussions with Ocalan were close to bringing about some elements of agreement in the summer of 2011, but PKK hardliners expressed their opposition to the talks by staging a major attack on Turkish troops, killing 13 soldiers (Today’s Zaman, July 27, 2011; February 6, 2012).

The PKK’s troubled situation suggests some cautious optimism for Turkey’s counterterrorism efforts; in recent months the organization has been hit both at the military and political level. However, it seems the PKK hardliners ultimately have the upper hand, as ambushes against Turkish troops and terrorist attacks in urban areas continue regardless of any top-level negotiation. Paradoxically, the PKK’s strategic failure might in fact hinder future negotiations: as the movement becomes more and more fragmented without a proper national platform for political discussion. As long as the PKK hawks keeps refusing any form of dialogue, meetings between Turkey’s representatives and PKK leaders are doomed to bring only fleeting results, if any.

WPR Briefing – Turkey’s F-35 Decision Driven by Technology Transfer Concerns

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ISR, Procurement, SSM, Israel, Aselsan, Lockheed Martin, Eurofighter, Typhoon, F-16, F-35

The full version of this briefing can be found on the WPR website and on Amazon.com

On Jan. 5, Turkey’s Defense Industry Executive Committee, chaired by Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, authorized the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries to open negotiations with Lockheed Martin for the purchase of two F-35 multi-role combat fighters. The announcement represents yet another reversal for the troubled program, considering Turkey’s original intention in 2002 to acquire 100 F-35s. It was followed by Britain’s declaration in February that it will postpone making any formal commitment to the F-35 until 2015. Australia, too, is currently reconsidering plans to buy 12 F-35s, and the F-35’s structural problems, which emerged during recent flight tests, led the U.S. Department of Defense to issue a technical report in December 2011 that recommended slowing down U.S. acquisitions as well.

But Ankara’s decision to drastically scale back its F-35 purchase is not just driven by the project’s technical problems. It also has to do with the United States’ uneasiness in sharing technology with Turkey, a problem dating back to the 1980s, when Turkey purchased its first F-16s. Turkey’s main interest is in acquiring software source codes for weapon systems, which the U.S. Congress has so far refused to share. In particular, Turkey wants control over the aircraft’s identification friend or foe (IFF) system in order to offer more flexibility with regard to how its fleet identifies foreign air force jets. The default setting of the original U.S. software for Turkey’s F-16 fleet, for instance, identified Israeli air force jets as exclusively friendly. To overcome the problem, ASELSAN, one of Turkey’s leading defense companies, developed a new IFF system, which was finalized in September 2011 and is now operational on Turkey’s F-16 fleet. The new system allows Turkish fighters to bypass the original software restrictions, allowing Turkish pilots to determine whether to recognize Israeli fighters as either friendly or hostile. (…)

Terrorism Monitor (Jamestown Foundation) – The Uludere Air Raid and Systemic Gaps in Turkey’s Intelligence Infrastructure

Tags

Counter-Insurgency, Counterterrorism, Hakan Fidan, Intelligence, Iraqi Kurdistan, ISR, MIT, Necdet Özel, PKK, UAV, Uludere

The original version of this analysis can be found on Terrorism Monitor, Volume X, Issue 2

When smugglers were mistaken for militants in southeastern Turkey on December 28, 2011, a Turkish air raid killed 35 civilians who were carrying fuel across the Turkish-Iraqi border near the village of Ortasu, in the Uludere district. In the following days, media reports hinted that the Milli Istihbarat Teskilati (MIT – Turkey’s national intelligence organization) might have provided the military with misleading information in relation to the nature of expected movements across the border, resulting in the military’s mistaken threat assessment. The operation was launched after the smugglers were mistaken for militants belonging to the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK), whose members generally infiltrate Turkey from northern Iraq using the same routes (Hurriyet, December 29, 2011). In an attempt to cast light on the incident, the Turkish General Staff released a statement which reported that an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) belonging to the Turkish Army spotted a group of people trying to cross the Turkish-Iraqi border from the Iraqi side at 06:39 PM, and that Turkish F-16 jet fighters carried out the subsequent air strike between 09:37 and 10:24 PM after the group failed to respond to warning shots and signals (Today’s Zaman, December 29, 2011).

Right after the incident, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan seemed to be buying time while trying to come up with an explanation, stating that the operation was carried out on the basis of information MIT provided in the previous weeks, but that MIT did not provide any real time intelligence immediately before the operation was launched. The uncertainty was still apparent on January 2 when a meeting with Chief of General Staff General Necdet Ozel did not lead to a joint official statement on the incident, suggesting that further examination of the case was needed (Hurriyet, December 31, 2011; Today’s Zaman, January 2). Following the incident, the MIT declared it had no role or responsibility in the air raid and released an official statement on January 5 claiming it did not share any intelligence on people, locations, dates or routes which might have been related to the attack (Cumhuriyet, January 6; Vatan, January 6; Hurriyet, January 6).

It seems unlikely that MIT had any responsibility for the incident. As stated by the military, reconnaissance and surveillance had been carried out through UAVs, which are controlled and monitored by the Army. Still, what Huseyin Celik, the deputy chairman of the ruling Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AKP – Justice and Development Party) described as an “unfortunate operational accident” might in fact be a demonstration of Turkey’s systemic intelligence gaps rather than the fault of a single institution (Hurriyet, December 29, 2011).

One of the problems the incident highlighted is the lack of civilian oversight of military operations. As the military stated, the UAV spotted the moving group at 06:39 PM, while jet fighters attacked at 09:37 PM. For a three hour-span, commanding officers were acting with total autonomy but clearly took some time before deciding to launch an air raid. The fact that the Prime Minister was collecting information from the military after the fact suggests there was no civilian monitoring of the operation. During that time the military did not contact any politician or civilian authority to involve a civilian decision-maker in the operation. The absence of civilian oversight during military operations is a recurrent and troublesome element in Turkish civil-military relations, but it becomes particularly problematic in situations such as the one at Uludere, where the same institution ends up being in charge of both the intelligence cycle and the decision-making process.

Another systemic problem in Turkish intelligence is the lack of interagency cooperation. In the context of the Uludere case, the extent of cooperation between MIT and the military remains uncertain. The two institutions have a history of rivalry, especially since MIT came under civilian control about 15 years ago, with the most recent example occurring in October 2011, when the Chief of General Staff General Ozel stated the military was absolutely in the dark about the fact that MIT was engaged in secret negotiations with PKK leaders, a fact that was revealed only after a secret recording of a meeting was leaked (Hurriyet, October 30, 2011). Recent reforms tried to diminish personnel attrition and distance between different intelligence bodies, but with no tangible results so far. The National Intelligence Cooperation Council, created in 2005, did not help in developing a cooperative culture amongst Turkey’s intelligence agencies. Even the creation in February 2010 of the Undersecretariat for Public Order and Security, conceived to ensure coordination between institutions involved in different aspects of counterterrorism, including intelligence, did not deliver significant results.

The head of the MIT, Hakan Fidan, is working in close cooperation with Prime Minister Erdogan in order to implement a reform of the intelligence system that will gather all relevant agencies around a new undersecretariat that will come under the authority of the MIT, an organization Fidan predicts will be one of the world’s ten largest intelligence agencies within the next two to three years (Hurriyet, January 6; Sabah, January 6). An important step in this process occurred earlier this month, when the MIT took control of most of the functions of the Joint Staff Electronic Systems Command, about 20 km south of Ankara. While some of the sophisticated communications equipment will continue to be used by the military for communications with Turkish forces operating outside of the homeland, the rest, including advanced monitoring equipment, will come under civilian control (Hurriyet, January 3).

The promised reforms to Turkey’s intelligence institutions have significant potential, as they might help mitigate the existing lack of civilian oversight of Turkish military operations and promote interagency cooperation, but they need to succeed exactly where previous reforms have failed.